The rising systems programming language Rust is fast, efficient and memory safe. However, improperly dereferencing raw pointers in Rust causes new safety problems. In this paper, we present a detailed analysis into these problems and propose a practical hybrid approach to detecting unsafe raw pointer dereferencing behaviors. Our approach employs pattern matching to identify functions that can be used to generate illegal multiple mutable references (We define them as thief function) and instruments the dereferencing operation in order to perform dynamic checking at runtime. We implement a tool named UnsafeFencer and has successfully identified 52 thief functions in 28 real-world crates * , of which 13 public functions are verified to generate multiple mutable references.
Introduction
The most widely used systems programming languages like C and C++ allow unrestricted use of pointers to access system resources, which has resulted in notorious security problems such as null pointer dereferencing, dangling pointers, double-free. Programming languages like Java take in strong type system with a garbage collector to protect the system free of memory error but downgrade system performance. The aim of Rust is to make systems programming safe without performance sacrifices [1] . Being safe, fast and efficient for parallelism, Rust has quickly attracted many developers to join the community and was voted as the most loved programming language in 2016 * * and 2017 * * * . By adopting conservative type checking mechanisms, Rust is able to guarantee memory safety if the codes are written in safe Rust convention. However, the rules are too strict that even safe behaviors could be rejected. Thus, unsafe Rust feature is enabled to allow programmers perform dangerous operations: dereferencing a raw pointer, calling an unsafe function or method, accessing or modifying a mutable static variable and implementing an unsafe trait [2] . Specifically, dereferencing raw pointers could lead to the violation of type checking rules and bring in new safety problems, e.g., generating multiple mutable references to bring in inconsistency bugs, mutating immutable values to cause false results.
Our research focuses on detecting unsafe behaviors caused by raw pointer dereferencing in Rust. The biggest [4] are working on using formalization to verify the safety of Rust. Matsakis [5] , [6] proposed to build a boundary between safe Rust and unsafe Rust. Both approaches require modifying the existing compiler system, which could bring in compatibility problems as Rust is still evolving. We study the new safety problems in Rust and present a hybrid approach to detecting unsafe raw pointer dereferencing behaviors. The approach consists of a pattern-based static method to detect thief functions that could generate multiple mutable references, and a instrumentation-based dynamic method to detect unsafe raw pointer dereferencing at runtime. In summary, we make the following contributions: (1) First systematic study on unsafe raw pointer dereferencing behavior. We present the first study (to the best of our knowledge) of unsafe raw pointer dereferencing in Rust and analyze the new safety problems caused by it. (2) A practical hybrid detection method. We evaluated our pattern-based static method with real-world crates, and found more than 50 thief functions. Our instrumentationbased dynamic method is able to detect unsafe raw pointer dereferencing behaviors at runtime with acceptable performance overheads. (3) A portable tool to assist programmers. We implement UnsafeFencer on Rust compiler plugin and make it available online. It is light-weight, flexible to deploy and doesn't require changing the compiler.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 presents the threat analysis. Section 3 introduces our approach. Section 4 demonstrates the evaluation. Conclusions are given in Sect. 5.
Threat Analysis
There are two types of raw pointers in Rust: immutable raw pointer(*const T) and mutable raw pointer (*mut T). Rust allows creating raw pointer in safe Rust, but dereferencing raw pointers has to be written in codes annotated with unsafe. Like C pointers, Rust raw pointer can also be used to access arbitrary data, modify values it points to.
Values in Rust are scoped and bound to a unique owner (variable). When the owner runs out of scope, the value should never be accessed. By default, every value is declared immutable to prevent later mutation. In order to prevent data races, Rust forbid multiple mutable references to exist in one scope. Unfortunately, raw pointer dereferencing can be used to break these protections and causes new safety problems. Three examples are demonstrated in Fig. 1: (1) Generating multiple mutable references. Rust forbids multiple mutable references existing in the same scope to prevent concurrency problems. In Fig. 1 , function generate_mutable_reference illustrates how raw pointer dereferencing can break this regulation. An immutable reference is passed into the function as an input argument, which is converted to an immutable raw pointer p in line 3, and p is cast to a mutable raw pointer q. In line 5, q is dereferenced and generates a mutable reference which acts as the return value. Compiler fails to detect the a is mutably referenced inside the function. Thus, in exploit_multiple, mutable references c and d will exist in the same scope, both of which can be used to modify the values of a. In thread programming, this may cause inconsistency and affects the program to produce false results. A real-world bug of this kind exists in Rust 1.15's kernel library † . (2) Mutating immutable variables. In Rust, every value is attached with a mutability attribute to specify if it can be mutated later. Mutating immutable value may cause the program to execute wrong paths and render wrong results. In function unsafe mutate immutable (Fig. 1) , an immutable variable x is declared in line 14, its reference is converted to a mutable raw pointer in line 16, 17. In line 18, the raw pointer is dereferenced and assigns a new value to x. When it comes to line 20, the value x is changed to 12, so the program will go to line 22 instead of the right path (line 21). A wrong value is returned, which would cause unpredicted results. (3) Accessing freed memory. Using freed value is a notorious problem for the C language, which may be exploited to reveal sensitive data. Safe Rust is free of this because it regulates every value to have a unique owner, and when the owner is not valid, any references to that value are rejected. However raw pointer dereferencing can make an exception. Nicholas [6] introduced a scenario in which freed Box value can be accessed. Box is a special pointer type for heap allocation provided by Rust core library. As shown in Fig. 1 , innocent_looking_fn [6] generates a new Box<unsize> q from a raw pointer using Box::from_raw function. q's life ends at line 26, at the same time the value is freed. In the function exploit_innocent [6] , the compiler assumes b is borrowed and it is alive after the function call in line 30, so it will not prompt errors in line 31. In this way, the freed b is reused and can be exploited to reveal data.
To conclude, raw pointer dereferencing takes a key role † https://blog.rust-lang.org/2017/02/09/Rust-1.15.1.html in the generation of these safety problems. In the first example, raw pointer is used to generate mutable references. In the second example, it was used to perform mutation on immutable values. In the third example, it was employed to access values. These safety problems break the memory safety guarantee and bring in vulnerabilities. This requires a dedicated study into raw pointer dereferencing.
Approach
Our hybrid approach contains two steps. The first step is to employ pattern matching to identify thief functions. The other step is to instrument the dereferencing operation so that we can detect unsafe raw pointer dereferencing behavior at runtime.
Pattern-Based Static Detection
Rust checks multiple mutable references both at safe Rust and unsafe Rust. The compiler is aware of the references generated directly from the "&mut" expressions, but the ones generated through raw pointer dereferencing are beyond its knowledge. This is because Condition 1 is the most fundamental one, if there are no mutable references in return value, obviously that function won't generate mutable references. As to condition 2, Rust forbid multiple mutable references to exist in the same scope, if a function containing the same arguments is called multiple times, and some arguments are mutable references, Rust will definitely deny it. Besides, the returned reference won't refer to any value in the input arguments or declared in the function body because references can't live longer than values. Values in the input or declared in the function must end their life before the exit of the function. The third condition is to exclude the functions whose unsafety attributes are clear to the developers. With this pattern, we apply pattern checking to identify thief functions.
Instrumentation-Based Dynamic Detection
The dynamic method instruments dereferencing operation with codes to do validity checking. A tag field is employed to store the status of the value. Every value specified for test is appended with a tag to store the status. The tag is initialized when the value is declared, and changes as the status updates. When dereferencing happens, the instrumented code checks whether the status matches. If some checking rules are triggered, an error would be raised. Annotating the value. Rust is a strong-typed language, every value is typed. There are generally two categories of types: primitive types and compound types which are defined by structures. (1) For each specified structure, a tag field is appended to the end of that structure. (2) For each primitive type, we define a shadow primitive structure. The structure contains two fields, one for the primitive type, the other for the tag. Any statement or functions using that value are rewritten to fit the new structure. An example is given in Fig. 2 . The variable i in function bar is specified for test, it has a primitive type i32. A structure Shadowi32 is defined to replace i32. Function (foo) with i involved as input argument is rewritten to (fooShadow). Usage of i (line 2) is replaced by i.data in fooShadow. Updating tags. The tag has three variants: readonly, dropped and writable. Each time the value is declared, the tag is initialized to the corresponding value. By default, a variable is declared as immutable, so the tag is set to readonly. For mutable value, its tag is set to writable. Values in Rust are scoped, when its owner leaves the scope, its tag is changed to dropped. Instrumenting dereferencing operations. At every deref- erencing site, we instrument additional codes to check if the variable is in the right status according to the following rules: (1) Accessing variable is valid unless the tag is dropped. Tag with dropped means the value it relates to is freed, which means any further access is illegal. (2) Assigning values is invalid if the tag is dropped or readonly. Tag with readonly means its value is immutable and it is illegal to perform assign operation on an immutable value.
Implementation
We implement the approach as a tool UnsafeFencer on Rust compiler plugin † . UnsafeFencer is made up of two components: finder and fencer. The finder transverses the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) to find thief functions matching the pattern. The fencer applies instrumentation to AST. At every dereferencing site, it inserts codes to perform the validity checking. During execution, the inserted code will execute before dereferencing occurs. It will throw errors if unsafe behavior is detected. UnsafeFencer is flexible to deploy as compile plugin which can be turned off to the programmers' needs. The code is available at https://github.com/qorost/unsafefencer.
Evaluation

Evaluating Pattern-Based Static Detection
We downloaded all the available crate (as of May. 2017) and selected 8,843 latest crates to perform the evaluation. Due to the inappropriate configuration of running environment, 5,703 crates were able to run the experiments successfully. Table 1 shows the 28 crates detected with thief functions. We have identified 52 thief functions, of which 13 ones from 6 crates are public. We inspected the source codes and verified these public functions can be used to generate multiple mutable references. Figure 3 depicts a real-world thief function found in lpc43xx project, function gpio_port (the signature is presented in line 9) returns a mutable reference, and doesn't contain any mutable references in the input arguments. By calling it consecutively, two mutable references x and y referring to the same value † https://doc.rust-lang.org/1.7.0/book/compiler-plugins.html are generated (lines 4, 5).
Evaluating Dynamic Detection Method
To evaluate the performance of the dynamic method, we design a code constructed with various numbers of functions from the same template. The template function consists of 18 lines of code, in which we define a structure, and declare a mutable and an immutable variable of that structure whose values are accessed by dereferencing raw pointers. We also define a function to dereference references. In total, there are 3 dereferencing operations. To make the measurement accurate, we exclude resource consuming operations (e.g., write operations). We compare the execution time under our UnsafeFencer with time spent under the normal code. The performance is measured by total CPU time and the experiments are carried on an Intel NUC machine, which is equipped with i7-6770HQ CPU and 8 Gb memory. Results are depicted in Fig. 4 . The solid line represents the results running with UnsafeFencer and dashed one without it. The runtime overhead of UnsafeFencer ranges from 1.94% (2,000 functions, 40,004 lines of code) to 7.62% (5,000 functions, 100,004 lines of code) and has an average of 4.13%. In total, the overhead is small and acceptable.
Conclusions
In this paper, we study how raw pointer dereferencing can cause new safety problems in Rust. We demonstrate and analyze how it could lead to generating multiple mutable references, modifying immutable values and accessing freed values. Aimed at these problems, we propose a practical and portable hybrid approach and implement it on Rust compiler plugin. Our tool UnsafeFencer has successfully identified 52 thief functions in 28 real-world crates. Evaluation reveals it causes small performance overheads.
